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THE COHERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR: 
FACING THE CHALLENGE OF IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM 
 
Alicia Cebada Romero1 
 
Abstract 
The incoherence into which the European Union falls in particular areas might be conceived as 
weaknesses, which put into question the very conception of the European Union as a civilian 
power (or “soft power”) and cast some doubts about the new logic that would allegedly lie 
behind this conception. Does a specific European model of external action exist? Are there any 
differences between the way in which the European Union approaches International Law and the 
way in which hegemonic States do so? What is the relationship between external action and 
legitimation in the case of the European Union? All these questions are addressed in this article, 
being the underlying idea that the European model is clearly delineated in the European 
discourse. Nevertheless the lines of such a model are being blurred due, at least in part, to the 
own European Union incoherencies, which are particularly abundant in certain areas, such as 
immigration and asylum. The need arises for the European Union to completely develop its civil 
power model, for this will be beneficial for the EU itself, for the international society and 
eventually for international law.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Professor (“Profesora Contratada Doctora”) on International Public Law and European Union Law. Universidad 
Carlos III, Madrid. Email Address: alicia.cebada@uc3m.es. I want to express my gratitude for the comments 
received from Professor David Gantz (University of Arizona) and Professors Mattias Kumm, Kevin Davis and 
Simon Chesterman (New York University). Among my colleagues as Emile Noel Fellows at New York University, I 
am particularly grateful for the comments received from Cathryn Costello and Gareth Davies. Last but not least I 
want to express my gratitude to Carmen Pérez González for having shared her knowledge on immigration. 
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I. GENERAL REMARKS 
 
It is not only the so-many invoked lack of military power that undermines the position of the EU 
in the world but also – and maybe primarily – its own incoherencies in its performance as 
“civilian power”. In this sense, European policies on trade as well as on admission of people 
(including immigration and asylum) might be conceived as weaknesses, which put into question 
the very conception of the European Union as a civilian power (or “soft power”2) and cast some 
doubts about the new logic that would allegedly lie behind this conception3.  
 
Within the above mentioned areas, the EU falls closer to the logic traditionally applied by 
dominant States, namely a logic mostly based on submission/imposition (linked to power), rather 
than on recognition/acceptance (linked to reputation-legitimacy4), which would better fit the 
notion of civilian power.  
 
Even though the European Union is firmly committed to multilateralism5, the truth is that in 
some areas – such as the mentioned above -, the European policies are reflective of interests that 
do not match or, what is worse, even collide with the interests reflected in the multilateral 
                                                 
2 HETTNE, B; SÖDERBAUM, F. “Civilian Power or soft imperialism: the EU as a global actor and the role of 
interregionalism”. In: European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, 2005, p. 535-582, at p. 536 
3 On the connection between actorness and “the ability to determine the criteria governing eligibility”, including “for 
admission of migrants or asylum seekers”, see: BRETHERTON, Charlotte; VOGLER, John. “The European Union 
as a Global Actor”. London; NY: Routledge, 1999, p. 223. 
4 FASTENRATH stresses the relevance of reputation for the subjects within the international legal order, wherein a 
rule has as many meanings as interpretations yielded by different international actors. FASTENRATH. “Relative 
normativity in International Law”  4 EJIL, 1993,EJIL, 1993, p. 336. 
5 Article III-292 of the “failed” Constitutional Treaty was very clear to this regard:  (1) The Union’s action on the 
international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. 
(2) The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries and international, 
regional or global organizations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote 
multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations. 
(3) The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of 
cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: 
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; 
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;  
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the 
Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders; 
[ ... ] 
(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. 
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agenda. To not mention the fact that these actions are inconsistent with the own European 
discourse in which the commitment to multilateralism occupies a prominent position. These 
incoherencies drive the European Union to a loss of legitimacy, so that its position as a civilian 
power6 results clearly undermined.  
 
With regard to these coherence gaps, particularly within the field of the policy on admission of 
people, the denounced inconsistency might be conceived of as a consequence of the fact that the 
European Union is shaping its identity through two different ways. In a sense, the formation of 
identity through the exclusion of the others may be deemed troublesome precisely due to its 
inconsistency with the values upon which the EU’s external action is allegedly founded, an 
external action which is also a way through which the European identity is defined7. Whereas the 
coherence exists to a greater extent within the field of admission of new members, the 
incoherence pops up when it comes to determine the criteria for admission of individuals. The 
resulting landscape is, to say the least, confusing: the European Union follows two different 
paths with the view, in both cases, to defining its identity and it turns out that the European 
Union going along one of the paths seems to be different from the European Union that follows 
the other path.  
 
It might be said that this situation merely reflects the fact that the way in which the European 
Union approaches international law does not differ from the way in which dominant States do so. 
We all are pretty aware of how difficult is to combine universal values with the preservation of 
State’s borders. The interaction between powerful States and international law has been 
examined by Nico Krisch, who has contended that hegemons oscillate between the submission to 
international law as a legitimizing tool, on the one part, and the withdrawal of international law 
in the pursuit of short-term unilateral interests, on the other part8. From our point of view the 
difference between the European Union and the dominant States, when it comes to define the 
terms of their interaction with international law, arises out of the fact that in the case of the 
                                                 
6 European Commission, Communication: “The European Union in the world” COM (2006) 278 final, 8 June 2006: 
“Unsatisfactory co-ordination between different actors and policies means that the EU loses 
potential leverage internationally, both politically and economically” 
7 DILLON, Sara. “Looking for the progressive empire: Where is the European Union’s Foreign Policy?” In: 
Connecticut Journal of International law, 19, 2004, p. 275.  
8 KRISCH, Nico. “International Law in times of hegemony: unequal power and the shaping of the international legal 
order”. 16 Eur. J. Int´l L. 369.  
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European Union the search for legitimacy is directly associated with the shaping of self-identity 
and with the entrenchment of its autonomy. To further illustrate this difference, we can refer to 
particular circumstances arising in the case of the European Union:  
 
a) The definition of the content of the EU´s international legal personality has to be derived 
from the founding Treaties as well as from the European institutions’ acts through which 
the implementation of the Treaties takes place (it could be said in other words that the 
definition of the international legal personality derives from the rules of the 
Organization). This circumstance partly explains the relevance of the discourse in the 
case of the European Union. Whereas the States constitute a particular and essential 
category of international legal subjects, with competences and powers clearly delineated 
from a legal perspective (even though the contours of some of the existing limitations to 
the State powers remain unclear), the picture is far from being as clear in the case of the 
European Union as an international organization. The diversity characterizes the universe 
of international organizations within which, in addition, the European Union constitutes a 
unique specimen. At this point we might refer again to Fastenrath who contended that 
through the communicative action it is not only the meaning of the international rule to 
be defined, but it is also the identity of the subjects engaged in this communicative 
process that is being shaped9. In the case of the European Union the association between 
discourse and identity is beyond any doubt. The European Union defines itself through its 
discourse.   
 
b) The European Union, as happens with the States, has to gain both international and 
internal legitimacy, but the difference is that when we refer to internal legitimacy in the 
case of the European Union we find two different actors from which the Union has to 
gain recognition: member states and European citizens. The European Union suffers from 
the lack of ways to communicate directly with the European citizens; the Member States 
play a crucial role in this communicative process, so that the communication between the 
European institutions and the citizens may be somehow distorted by the participation of 
the States. Under these conditions, the search for legitimacy in the case of the European 
                                                 
9 FASTENRATH. “Relative normativity in International Law”  4 EJIL, 1993,EJIL, 1993, p. 336. 
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Union is particularly difficult due to the need to preserve the tenuous balance between the 
supranational interest and the national interest, being the crucial challenge to persuade the 
individuals that their personal interests may be closer to the supranational than to the 
national interest. It might be easier for the European Union to circumvent the Member 
States in this communicative process with the European citizens should the 
communication be based on the external action of the EU so that recognition from the 
citizens is gained through this action10.  
 
c) The European Union is a framework intrinsically bound to promote cooperation and 
solidarity and where consequently the unilateral interests of the States might be more 
easily overcome. And here it is worth stressing that the European Union has the proper 
tools to display this function. The extent to which solidarity is present within the 
European process will be further examined in following sections of this paper. 
 
d) The recognition of the basic values upon which international law is nowadays based, as 
embodied in the notion of ius cogens, is a constitutive feature of the European Union’s 
identity. Whereas the existence of a given State does not depend on its attitude towards 
International Law, the EU, as every international organization, is founded upon the 
commitment to abide by these peremptory rules, within the parameters established in 
article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties11. According to this 
provision, it may be said that the respect for peremptory rules is a constitutive element of 
the European Union, whereas this is not the case with the States.   
 
As a result of the concurrence of all these circumstances in the case of the European Union, we 
find a powerful actor, whose roots are firmly buried in the international legal order and which 
has a paramount interest in supporting multilateralism as a way to see its legitimacy increased. 
Nevertheless, as we are advocating multilateralism, a disclaimer may be necessary at this point. 
Multilateralism is incarnated in international organizations, which are supposed to shape and 
                                                 
10 BRETHERTON; VOGLER draw attention to some analysis, which “indicate a widely held perception that, after 
its most highly approved function of maintaining an island of peace within its own borders, the EU’s most important 
role is perceived as protecting and promoting European interests in the wider world. This suggests public support for 
the Union’s aim to assert its identity on the international scene”, op. cit., at p. 235 
11 Court of First Instance, Judgment 21 September 2005, T 315/01, p. 226-227 
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promote global or multilateral interest. Even though the interests of both, weak States and their 
suffering population, find many difficulties not only to be implemented but even to be effectively 
voiced within these institutionalised multilateral frameworks, it is clear that it would be worse 
not to have such frameworks. Some voices, such as Chimni´s, have energically claimed that the 
existing international institutions are tools at the service of imperialism and that they suffer from 
a deficit of both democracy and legitimacy12. We partly concur with these criticisms, but also 
think that it is not less true that the non-dominant countries, particularly within the international 
institutions, which have reached a certain level of autonomy, might exploit precisely these 
deficits. It is the case with the World Trade Organization (WTO). Even though it is far from 
being easy for the least well off countries to forge the alliances which would allow them to 
effectively voice their claims with a view to obtaining proper responses to their needs, the fact is 
that the more autonomy the Organization gets, the more clear is the interest of the Organization 
itself to be responsive to those complaints as a way to gain legitimacy. It is not without 
difficulties that an international institution gets the level of autonomy required to be able to 
impose an interest associated with the need to alleviate its legitimacy deficit. The tension 
between the interest of the Organization and the unilateral interests of the powerful member 
States will always be present and the result of the underlying struggle will be more or less 
favourable to the Organization depending on the level of autonomy reached by it.  
 
At this point, it seems necessary to mention the recent failure of the Doha Round, last summer. 
The recalcitrant defence of the interests, within the agricultural sector, of the two most powerful 
WTO Members, United States and European Community, seem to have precipitated this 
daunting result. The Doha Round, as such, may be seen as an attempt on the part of the WTO to 
alleviate its legitimacy deficit through the clarification of the relationship between trade and 
development. Eventually, in spite of the efforts of the Director General, Pascal Lamy, who 
repeatedly expressed in all the possible ways that it was in the vital interest of the WTO to offer 
                                                 
12 B.S, Chimni. “International Institutions today: an imperial global State in the making”. In: 15 Eur. J. Int´l L. 1.  It 
is clear that he is not against International institutions, but against the way in which they are currently shaped and 
put at the service of what he calls “an imperialist State”.  The best demonstration that he is not against  
institutionalization as such is that he preconizes the “institutionalization” of some form of global society through the 
creation of a global parliament, which would contribute to the realization of the direct democracy in the world. See 
also: POGGE, Thomas. “Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor” En:  
Leiden Journal of International Law 18/4 (2005), 717-745 
  8 
a response to the developing countries claims13, the result yielded is just a disenchanting failure 
that evokes the landscape described by Chimni: the international institution appears once more as 
a tool to serve the dominant State’s interests. This kind of behaviour prevents us from being 
excessively optimistic in regard to the “positive” interaction between the European Union and 
international law.  
 
 
II  ABOUT THE RELEVANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION, 
AND ABOUT THE “NEW” LOGIC UNDERLYING THAT ACTION.  
 
The definition of the European Union as a civilian power is more than a mere contradiction in 
terms14. Following Nicolaides and Howse, it might be said that when this definition is applied to 
the European Union it becomes an “oxymoron”15, indeed it could be deemed as a reference to a 
new form of behavior within international relations, being this new behavior reflective of an 
unprecedented rationality.  
 
As said in the previous section of this paper, the lack of statehood in the case of the European 
Union gives more relevance to the need for it to get recognition (increased support and 
legitimacy) as a way not only to entrench its actorness but also to define the precise contours of 
its international legal personality. As is well known the EU may be conceived of as a very sui 
generis international organization16. Uniqueness, dynamism and autonomy are its main features. 
As an international organization the European Union is founded upon an international treaty.17  
The specificity of the European Union arises from the extent to which, even though it is formally 
a State actor, it can express its own will. The European Union has gone the furthest, within the 
                                                 
13 These Lamy´s words are sufficiently clear: “trade is the missing piece of the development puzzle – an essential 
third pillar. (…) the goal is not freer trade for trade’s sake. It’s about better living Standards for all countries – 
developing and developed alike”.  Remarks at the Development Committee World Bank, 25 September 2005. 
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/sppl e/sppl04 e.htm  
14 BULL, Hedley. “Civilian Power Europe: a contradiction in terms”. In: Journal of Common Market Studies, n. 1-2, 
p. 149-164 
15 NICOLAIDES, K; HOWSE, R. “This is my EUtopia…:Narrative as power” JCMS 2002, Volume 40, Number 4, 
p. 767-792 
16 WEILER J.H.H; HALTERN, Ulrich. R. “The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order – Through the Looking 
Glass”. In: 37 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1996, 411 
17There is not “autopoesis” in the case of the European Union: NICOLAIDES, K; HOWSE, R. “This is my 
EUtopia…:Narrative as power” JCMS 2002, Volume 40, Number 4, p. 781 
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universe of international organizations, in the development of supranational formulas (including 
the existence of a reinforced supranational legal order), consequently reaching unprecedented 
levels of autonomy18. In this regard, the analysis of the EU as a self-contained regime is 
particularly attractive19. The supranational dynamic coexists with an intergovernmental dynamic, 
which operates in the areas of EU competence. These two different dynamics give rise to two 
different legal orders: the EC’s legal order and the EU’s legal order, which are “integrated but 
separate”20, being the basic difference that the EC’s legal order is supranational.   
 
After having underlined the European Union’s autonomy, it seems necessary also to draw 
attention to the fact that the States of course still exist within the European Union (we cannot 
reckon without them). They exert a crucial influence in the evolution of the European process. 
This influence has been recognized by the European Commission, which in its recent 
Communication on the role of the European Union in the world, underscores that the success of 
the EU external action depends on three main factors, being the most important the existence of a 
political agreement among the Member States on the goals to be achieved through the European 
Union21.  
 
Precisely due to the fact that the States are essential pieces within the European process, the 
strength of the EU’s position in the world partly depends on its ability to prove that it is an 
autonomous entity. And, at the same time, the greater the recognition it gets from other 
international actors, the more autonomy it might gain vis-à-vis its constituents. Therefore, it 
comes as no surprise if we see the European Union engaged in an attempt to persuade the rest of 
the world that it has emerged a new type of superpower22, one which is at the same time a result 
                                                 
18 Mattias Kumm. “The jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy on Europe before and 
after the Constitutional Treaty”. In: European Law Journal, Vol. 11, issue 3, 2005, at p. 266. 
19 We have addressed this question: “Algunas reflexiones en torno a la “fragmentación”  del ordenamiento jurídico 
internacional en relación con las Organizaciones Internacionales”.  IVR XXII World Congress of Philosophy of Law 
and Social Philosophy. Law and Justice in a global society. May 24-29, Granada (Spain). In the process of being 
published. See recently: SIMMA, B; PULKOWSKI, D. “Of planets and the Universe: self contained regimes in 
international law”. EJIL, 2006, Vol. 17, n.3, p. 483-529. 
20 Judgment Court of First Instance, 21 September 2005, Case T-315/01, at paragraph 120. 
21 COM (2006) 278 final. 
22 On Europe’s identity, see: Von Bogdandy: The European Constitution and European identity: text and subtext of 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”. In: 3 Int’l J Const. Law, 295. 
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of the evolution of the international law and the international society and which can propel this 
evolution further, in a positive way, by counterbalancing the influence of the dominant States.  
 
After all these considerations, the paramount importance of the European Union’s external action 
seems utterly logical23. Grainne de Burca has accurately pointed out that the main result of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has been the reinforcement of the external side of 
the European Union’s action24, whereas allegedly the original intention of the drafters was rather 
to strengthen internal legitimacy. It’s undeniable that the external dimension of the European 
integration process has been steadily gaining relevance over the years in an apparently 
unstoppable process culminating with the so-called Constitutional Treaty. From the 
contemplation of this process the idea arises that it is no longer possible to sustain that the 
legitimacy crisis from which the European Union is suffering “is likely to undermine the 
credibility of the EU and hence impede its capacity to act externally”25. Even if we accept that 
the lack of internal legitimacy might undermine its ability to project itself on the world stage, it is 
equally true that the EU is using the external action precisely as a means to alleviate its 
legitimacy crisis. Therefore, the relationship between external action and legitimation appears 
very clearly.   
 
What are the ultimate reasons explaining the increasing brilliance of the external face of the EU? 
From the perspective of the European Union, as has been already said, there is a need to 
reinforce its identity not only in front of the world but also and maybe primarily, vis-à-vis both 
member States and European citizens.   
 
On the other part, and going back to the role of the Member States we have to refer to the 
reluctance on their part to accept the broadening of the EC´s competences, which is not new26 at 
all. The struggle for the competences has taken place over many years also within the field of the 
                                                 
23European Union has already left behind those times when it could be said: “Europe is not an actor in international 
affairs, and does not seem likely to become one”: BULL, Hedley. “Civilian Power Europe: a contradiction in terms”. 
In: Journal of Common Market Studies, n. 1-2, p. 149-164, at p. 151. 
24 DE BURCA, Grainne. “The drafting of a Constitution for the European Union: Europe’s madisonian moment or a 
moment of madness?” 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 555, spring, 2004. 
25 BRETHERTON, Charlotte; VOGLER, John. “The European Union... op. cit., p. 42. 
26 BRETHERTON, Charlotte; VOGLER, John. “The European Union... op. cit.  p. 17. 
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EC´s external relations27. Nevertheless, so far the States´ resistance has not prevented the 
European Community from gradually gaining relevance as an international actor. Our intuition 
here is that the States might be currently moving from the struggle for the competences within 
the supranational pillar of the European Union to a more subtle strategy, basically consisting of 
regaining some control over the external action by reinforcing the intergovernmental pillar 
through the accomplishment of remarkable progress within the area of European security and 
defence policy. To put it another way: the States might be trying to shift the focus from the 
external relations of the European Community (supranational area) to the security and defence 
field (intergovernmental area). Beyond this rather recent trend, the traditional reason explaining 
the relevance given by the Member States to the external action of the European Union is 
basically connected to their will to increase their leverage on the global scene by acting 
collectively under the umbrella of either the European Community or the European Union28.  
 
In the account on the relevance of the external face of the European Union, it is also central to 
point to the need, voiced by several scholars, to counterbalance the power of the dominant States, 
particularly of the United States29. In this contribution it is assumed that an alternative global 
discourse within the realm of international relations is needed and that it is possible. 
Furthermore, to be fully honest we have to admit that this research is grounded on our wish to 
see the European Union firmly articulating and implementing such an alternative discourse (and 
consequent action), which would hopefully lead to the reinforcement of certain areas of the 
international legal order, including, in particular, those related to the protection of human rights, 
development cooperation, the spread of democracy, regional solidarity, etc.  One of our primary 
contentions is that certain types of international organization might be considered as frameworks 
where the elaboration of this alternative discourse is facilitated, with the European Union being 
                                                 
27 We have already analysed the struggle for competences within the external action field: “La Organización 
Mundial del Comercio y la Unión Europea”. Biblioteca de Derecho de los Negocios, Madrid: Editorial La Ley, 
2002.  
28 This process is well described by CHAYES under the label of “new sovereignty”: CHAYES, Abram; CHAYES, 
Antonia. The new sovereignty Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1995 
29 See Jürgen Habermas & Jacques Derrida, February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common 
Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe, 10 Constellations 291, 293 (2003); FARRELL, Mary. “EU 
External Relations: exporting the EU Model of Governance?”. European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, 2005, 
n.4, p. 451-462: “As much as American unilateralism renews the legitimacy of power politics on the world stage, the 
normative approach in the European management of international relations sustains the relevance of the very notion 
of global governance”. At p. 453 
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the most advanced model of this kind of organization. As underlined in the preliminary remarks, 
the European Union is in a perfect position to propel a good evolution of the international legal 
order, contributing to delineate the contours and the content of the slippery notion of ius cogens.  
 
Nonetheless, a recent jurisprudence delivered by the European Court of First Instance (CFI) 
proves that the European institutions might not be fully aware of the extraordinary influential 
role that the European Union may play to this regard30. This jurisprudence is related to the EU´s 
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions imposing sanctions to 
individuals, who are hold responsible for being associated with Bin Laden or Al Qaida. An in-
depth examination of these judgments is beyond the scope of this contribution, but we cannot 
avoid offering some general remarks about them. In this jurisprudence, on the one hand, it is 
recognized that the international organizations are intrinsically bound to abide by ius cogens, 
according to article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. In spite of the relevance 
of the recognition of this “constitutive” submission to ius cogens, the CFI´s pronouncements 
leave us unsatisfied for in these judgments the Court proves not to be aware of the role that the 
European Union can play in influencing the evolution of international peremptory rules. This 
jurisprudence does not match our expectations for the Court takes a restrictive approach as 
regards human rights protection, giving precedence to an interpretation of international law in 
which the interest in security prevails over the interest to properly protect the fundamental rights 
of the individuals. We do not find in the judgments in point the necessary recognition of the 
unprecedented development of the international law on human rights that has been taking place 
in Europe, reference that might have driven the Court to examine the existence of an European 
(regional) ius cogens within this particular field. Instead, we only find recognition of the primacy 
of the United Nations Charter, and consequently of the Security Council resolutions, over the EC 
                                                 
30 CFI, Judgments 21 September 2005, T-315/01 and T-306/01; Judgment 12 July 2006, T-253/02. On this 
juriprudence see: ROLDÁN BARBERO, Javier. “La Justicia comunitaria y el control de legalidad de las 
resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas. Comentario a las Sentencia Yusuf/Al Barakaat y Kadi, 
de 21 de septiembre de 2005, del Tribunal de Primera Instancia de las Comunidades Europeas”. I: Revista Española 
de Derecho Internacional, vol. LVII (2005), n. 2 p. 878; ESPÓSITO, Carlos; BLÁZQUEZ, Irene. “Los límites al 
control judicial de las medidas de aplicación de la política exterior en los asuntos Ahmed Ali Yusuf/ Al Barakaat 
International Foundation y Yassin Abdullah Kadi”, Revista Española de Derecho Comunitario, núm. 17, 2006, pp. 
123-148; SANTOS VARA, Juan. “La indefesión de los particulares frente a las sanciones del Consejo de Seguridad: 
el reconocimiento de la competencia de los tribunales internos para controlar las resoluciones del Consejo de 
Seguridad en relación con el ius cogens. Comentario a las sentencias del TPI de 21 de septiembre de 2005, asuntos 
Yusuf/Al Barakaat y Kadi  y de 12 de julio de 2006, asuntos Ayadi/Hassan”. In: Revista General de Derecho 
Europeo, n. 11, 2006, Iustel: Portal de Derecho.  
  13 
law, according to the same parameters upon which the primacy of EC law over domestic law is 
articulated31. The result is a rather simplistic construction, in which no regard is paid to the fact 
that the Court of First Instance, when it comes to the implementation of Security Council’s 
resolutions, is in the position that was occupied by the Constitutional Courts when the definition 
of the relationship between the national Constitutions and the European legal order was into 
play. Hence, the European Court of First Instance does not take into account that it was precisely 
the Constitutional Court’s reluctance to accept the primacy of EC law as regards to the national 
constitutional rules enshrining human rights protection, that pushed the European Court to accept 
the gradual openness of the European legal order to the values enshrined in the national 
Constitutions, giving rise to a process in which the humanization of EC law was favoured. No 
due regard is either paid by the CFI to the fact that in contrast to the existence of a judicial 
mechanism within the European realm, there is no any institutional mechanism charged with the 
task to monitor the legality of the Security Council’s action.  
 
This jurisprudence is more worrying as it comes from an institution, which is called to defend the 
supranational interest. Our hope is that the European Court of Justice, which will have the last 
say32, may still deliver a decision suitable to propel instead of reversing the process of 
humanization of international law. The ultimate intervention of the ECJ is an additional 
guarantee.  
 
After all these considerations, the question remains about which is exactly the role that the 
European Union is playing on the international scene. It is true that it seems to be of EU´s 
interest to appear as a new kind of super-power, whose action does not rest primarily on power 
and subsequent submission, but on recognition. But we have also generous doses of European 
action that put the European reputation at risk33 and that are reflective of the difficulties to 
conciliate all the different interests in play.  
 
 
                                                 
31 See as example, Judgment 21 September 2005, T-315/01, p. 224 
32 The cases have been brought before the ECJ  in appeal: C-402/05; C-415/05 
33 The relevance of reputation in regard to the capacity to exert some influence through interpretation of 
international rules is stressed by Fastenrath: “Relative normativity in International Law”  4 EJIL, 1993,EJIL, 1993, 
p. 336. 
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III SOME REFLECTIONS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NEED OF 
RECOGNITION AND THE DEFINITION OF SELF-INTEREST IN THE CASE OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION. 
 
The ascertainment of the need of recognition in the case of the European Union leads us to 
interesting conclusions as regards the EU´s multilateralism orientation, associated with the 
definition of “self-interest”. As a way to improve its reputation, it is in the interest of the 
European Union to proclaim certain objectives and values, shared with the international 
community, as grounds for its external action.  
  
It is of interest to underline that within the EU there exist legal mechanisms to claim for full 
consistency between the European action and the European discourse. These mechanisms can be 
utilized by the European institutions and also by the individuals when the necessary requirements 
are met. In this line we would underscore the role of the European Commission, which, as is well 
known, is one of the European institutions more clearly representing the supranational interest. 
The European Commission plays a prominent role within the external action, negotiating with 
third countries for example. Even though in the implementation of this particular function it must 
follow the specific mandate issued by the Council, the fact is that the influence of the European 
Commission is remarkable in any case34: the European Commission determines to a great extent 
the approach to a particular country by drawing up the so-called strategic papers, in which the 
priorities in the relationship with that country may be established. The European Commission 
also gathers and manages plenty of information throughout its numerous delegations all over the 
world and so on. It is through their contacts with the European Commission that the third 
countries might more clearly exploit the argument of the harmful effects of incoherencies in 
EU’s external action for the EU itself. The European Commission is probably the European 
institution interested the most in gaining legitimacy by achieving a widespread recognition of the 
                                                 
34 A reference to the influential role of the Commission in pushing forward the negotiations with MERCOSUR: 
FAUST, Jorg. “Blueprint for an Interregional future? The European Union and the Southern Cone” In: 
AGGARWAL; FOGARTY (Ed.) “EU Trade Strategies: between regionalism and globalism”, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004, p. 52. In p. 57 he states: “Even if the Commission has not always been either unitary or consistent in the 
course of the policy process, it has been the body that has pushed interregional trade liberalization more thoroughly. 
This behavior is consistent with the argument that the EC has an interest in expanding the Union’s interregional 
trade policies as a means of increasing its influence within the EU”. 
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European Union by other international actors35, although it is not alone in the implementation of 
this task. We will analyze, below in this paper, the role of the European Parliament within the 
immigration and asylum fields. As regards to individuals, the recent cases brought before the 
European Court of First Instance, related to the imposition of “smart sanctions” by the EC in the 
implementation of UN Security Council resolutions is also paradigmatic. In many cases the 
European actions are ultimately monitored by the European Court of Justice, which supervises 
the legality of the impugned actions.  
 
It is worth stressing that in measuring the “legality” of the European action, it is not only the 
formal fulfillment of International rules that is at stake, but also the solidness of the European 
discourse, which is based on a particular interpretation of international rules, one which is 
inspired by the relevance conferred to the people, one which might ultimately propel the 
humanization of international law. In this line, the European judges have a particularly tenuous 
role to play for in many cases they will be called to decide whether to give precedence to an 
interpretation of international rules and EC rules, which might develop to its last consequences 
the values upon which the European discourse is built up, neglecting the reluctance expressed by 
the member States; or rather to opt for a more stingy interpretation which might be read as a step 
back in the process of humanization of international law, an interpretation that, to a certain 
extent, plays down the solidness of the European discourse.  It might be contended that in many 
cases the European incoherencies are supported not only by the member States, but also by the 
European population, so that for example as regards immigration, a restrictive approach – even 
when it is difficult to conciliate with the European commitment to human rights - is well 
accepted by the Europeans. In other words, it might be said that some incoherencies might have a 
low cost in terms of internal legitimacy. Nevertheless, we are doubtful about this reading, for the 
perceptions of the population may change, so that, following the immigration example, a less 
restrictive approach within the immigration field could be equally accepted as a better way to 
face the challenge represented by the large movements of people. An alternative discourse might 
be elaborated within international institutions. This option would require from the European a 
firm commitment to supporting the creation of a strong international organization tasked with the 
                                                 
35 AGGARWAL; FOGARTY. “Between regionalism and globalism: European Union Interregional Trade 
Strategies”. In: AGGARWAL, V.K; FOGARTY, E.A (Ed.) “EU Trade Strategies... op. cit, p. 10-12 
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management of immigration, for example. By favoring the shift of the decision making on the 
immigration field to the multilateral level, the European Union might contribute to change the 
European individuals perception that is currently biased towards the short-term interests of the 
destination States. Nevertheless, in order to avoid naivety, it is good also to recognize that, as has 
been unfortunately demonstrated by the failure of the Doha Round within the WTO, the 
existence of an institutionalized multilateral framework does not always guarantee the coherence. 
On the other hand this multilateralization is particularly difficult to accomplish within the 
immigration field, in this sense it suffices to recall that it has not been long since this area has 
been integrated into the EC´s realm.  
 
Going back to the analysis of the EU´s institutional structure and of its suitability to propel the 
European Union interest, we might bring the reader’s attention to a concept coined by Slaughter: 
“disaggregation of sovereignty”36, referred to the transnational interaction of the different State’s 
power. In the one hand it may be said that what Slaughter calls the “disaggregated transnational 
judicial, legislative and executive interaction” reaches its culmination in the relations among 
European States, as well as among States and European institutions, within the European Union. 
But we are interested in applying this idea of “disaggregation” not only to explain the evolution 
of the State’s sovereignty within the European framework, but also to better understand the 
rationality underlying the institutional structure of the EU itself. The idea behind this conception 
of disaggregation is the existence of a (transnational) communication among powers. Within the 
EU we find a different phenomenon leading to a similar result. If we have a look at the EU´s 
institutional structure what we find is the unification of different powers within the same 
Institution. As a consequence, within the European Union the communication among the 
different traditional powers can take place within the framework of the same Institution. This 
situation is an illustration of the difficulties encountered in balancing the different interests 
present in the European integration process.  For instance, even though the European 
Commission is traditionally presented as the institution representing the executive power, it is 
well known that it possesses also crucial prerogatives within the legislative process and that it is 
tasked with a monitoring function as well. It is not always easy to balance the different powers 
that the institution is called to exert.  
                                                 
36 SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. “International Law in a world of liberal States” 6 EJIL (1995) 503-538, p. 527 
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It may be useful, at this point, to further illustrate the relationship between the European Union’s 
interest and the multilateral interest. The point of departure may be the existing connection 
between the European Union’s multidimensionality and the European Union’s suitability to 
propel multilateralism37.  In the European Union’s realm, conceived of as a multidimensional 
framework, different objectives and priorities, also present within various multilateral 
frameworks, are brought together. The added value of the European Union might be the fact that 
as a comprehensive actor (almost as multidimensional as the States), it could contribute more 
comprehensively than many multilateral organizations to the achievement of many of these 
“multilateral” goals, being in a better position to manage the existing interconnection between 
them. No many States are powerful enough to undertake this kind of action. And whereas 
powerful States are not usually willing to support multilateralism, the European Union is 
probably intrinsically bound to promote it38. Due attention must be paid to the fact that the EU’s 
leverage on the world stage is certainly larger than the leverage of the vast majority of the states 
typically interested in supporting multilateralism, which basically are weak states benefiting 
from its participation within multilateral phora39. In this vein, we can make reference to the clear 
commitment on the part of the Latin-American States to multilateralism, as proclaimed in the 
Declaration of Mar del Plata issued at the Fourth Summit of Americas (2005): “To achieve our 
sustainable development objectives, we need international and multilateral institutions that are 
more efficient, democratic, and accountable” (Paragraph 16)40. More recently the commitment to 
supporting multilateralism has been reiterated within the Fourth European Union/Latin America 
and Caribbean Summit (Declaration of Vienna, 12 May 200641). It could be said that beyond the 
fact that through their participation in the European Union the States gain sovereignty, in the 
                                                 
37 We have developed this idea in: “Regional integration processes and the social dimension of globalization. The 
European experience: some reflections about its implementation in Latin-America” In: Revista Internacional de 
Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, September 2006 (in the process of being published). 
38 FASSBENDER. “The better peoples of the United Nations? Europe’s Practice and the United Nations” EJIL, 
2004, vol. 15, n. 5, p. 857-884 
39DE BURCA, Gráinne; SCOTT, Joanne. “The impact of the WTO on EU Decision Making, in: “The EU and the 
WTO: legal and constitutional issues”, p. 27;  HELD, David. “Democracy and the Global Order”, 1995, p. 16. 
GERHART, Peter M. “The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade Organization”. U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. Law, 
2003, Vol. 24, n. 1, p. 21.  
40http://www.summit-
americas.org/Documents%20for%20Argentina%20Summit%202005/IV%20Summit/Declaracion/Word%20Format/
Declaracion%20IV%20Cumbre-eng%20nov5%209pm%20rev.1.doc  
41 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/world/lac-vienna/docs/declaration es.pdf  
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sense that they increase their leverage on the international stage42; the European Union itself 
gains leverage in the world with this orientation towards multilateralism, namely turning to 
broader frameworks. Therefore, we think that it is possible to say that the EU’s 
multidimensionality coupled with a strong dose of supranationalism, makes the European Union 
a suitable international actor to propel the fragmented multilateral agenda.  
 
Nevertheless against this rather theoretical backdrop, the fact is that, the incoherence appears in 
the external projection of the European Union. The disappointment that this incoherence brings 
about, depends to a great extent on our expectations about the European Union. Precisely owing 
to its multilateralism orientation, to its high autonomy with regard to the States, to its willingness 
to support the cause of the least well off in the world, all of these elements clearly and repeatedly 
proclaimed in its own discourse, the incoherence is more unbearable in the case of the European 
Union. In other words, even though a certain degree of incoherence is unavoidable somehow, we 
may legitimately expect certain actors to be less incoherent than others, depending these 
expectations, partly at least, on the interest of the actor to be coherent. In the case of the 
European Union when it comes to the benefits arising from a coherent behavior, the stakes are 
high, connected to reputation, recognition, and legitimacy43. Precisely the relevance of the 
expectations has been acknowledged, very recently, by the European Commission itself in the 
following terms: “European citizens expect the Union to use its substantial international 
influence to protect and promote their interests and there is an expectation among our 
international partners for Europe to assume its global responsibilities”44. Actually the European 
Commission is here mentioning two different kinds of expectations: those from European 
citizens and those from EU´s international partners and the question arises whether both sets of 
expectations may be reconciled as well as whether the European Union might contribute to make 
this reconciliation easier.  
 
                                                 
42 CHAYES, Abram; CHAYES, Antonia. “The new sovereignty...  op. cit. 
43 We may legitimately ask whether it is sound to consider the European Union as an agent of the multilateral order. 
On the Agency Theory see for example: EISENHARDT, K. M.: “Agency theory: An Assessment and Review”. 
Academy of Management Review, 1989, vol. 14, nº 1, p. 57-74 
44 European Commission. Communication: “The European Union in the world” COM (2006) 278 final, 8 June  
2006. 
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Incoherence appears when self-interest drives the EU’s actions. We draw attention on the fact 
that we are using a restrictive definition of self-interest, conceived of as the own interest that 
either does not suit or even collides with the interests that make up the multilateral agenda.  
Thus, we are not here conceiving of as self-interest, the own interest that matches the priorities 
proclaimed within the multilateral phora. In other words, our definition of self-interest does not 
encompass all possible unilateral interests, but only those that cannot be reconciled with the 
multilateral interests. Given the EU’s proclaimed commitment to multilateralism, whenever we 
detect self-interest, as just defined, we will be also tracking incoherence to a certain extent.  
 
IV THE PROJECTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION THROUGH ITS DISCOURSE: 
JUST RHETORIC? 
 
We can provide examples illustrating that the European Union’s discourse goes beyond rhetoric, 
cases of European action that constitutes a coherent implementation of such a discourse.  
 
Mention may be made to one feature that clearly contributes to shape the EU´s identity: the 
European commitment to promoting solidarity. The solidarity is expressed both internally (and 
here we are referring to regional solidarity) and externally. Indeed, one of the most salient 
features of the regional model that the European Union incarnates is the existence of regional 
and cohesion policies. There is no other example of a regional process which has gone as far in 
the implementation of these policies. Nonetheless, solidarity is not easy to implement and even 
in Europe we have recently witnessed the difficulties encountered in reaching an agreement on 
the European budget. Solidarity increases cohesion but when more solidarity is required from the 
States the result could be the opposite: that internal cohesion is put at risk45. And it is clear that 
the recent enlargement has forced the Member States to explore the boundaries of solidarity.  
                                                 
45 From this “cohesion” perspective, PADOAN acknowledges the existence of limits: “Consensus to the regional 
agreement, and ultimately its size, will then depend on the degree of cohesion among its members. Cohesion 
problems will be greater the larger the asymmetric distribution effects, and therefore the larger the impact of scale 
effects generated by integration. These effects, in turn, will be greater the larger the diversity among members of the 
integration region. Once the costs for cohesion management (i.e. the costs that must be borne to offset the 
asymmetry effects) exceed the benefits from integration, the widening process will come to an end. A number will 
have been determined”. PADOAN, Pier Carlo. “Political Economy of New Regionalism and World Governance”. 
In: Teló, Mario. European Union and new regionalism. Regional actors and global governance in a post-hegemonic 
era. Ashgate, 2001, at. P. 43 
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In what Slaughter called “cross-fertilization among legal systems”46 the role of the European 
Union is remarkable. For instance, with regard to the relevance given by the European Union to 
the social dimension of globalization we could mention its efforts to export formulas, which are 
already being successfully used within the European framework, such as the open method of 
coordination47.  
 
Another feature characterizing the European Union is its commitment to the promotion of 
regionalism. The European Union has developed a close-woven network of international 
agreements with several countries throughout the world. Some of these agreements shelter 
clauses promoting regional integration among the partner State and its neighbors48. In broad 
terms even the agreements with non-neighboring countries can be conceived of as an example of 
regionalism49. They are certainly an expression of interregionalism50. This is particularly clear in 
the case of the prospective inter-regions agreements, currently under negotiation, with 
MERCOSUR and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).   
  
The EU’S effort in promoting regionalism could certainly be deciphered as an attempt to 
exporting the European regional model to other regions in the world (inspiring effect – 
assimilation effect). That is not to say that the exported product has to be exactly alike the 
European model. In this line, even though the European Union is perfectly aware that the 
                                                 
46 SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. “International Law in... op. cit. at p. 521 
47 We have analyzed the EU´s attempt to promote the usage of the open method of coordination, particularly within 
its relations with Latin American Countries. CEBADA ROMERO, A. “Regional integration processes and the social 
dimension of globalization. The European experience: some reflections about its implementation in Latin-America”. 
In: Revista Internacional de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, September 2006 (in the process of being published). 
48 Association and Stabilization Agreements with Balkan countries. See below.  
49 JOFFE, George Howard. “European Union and the Mediterranean”. In: TELO, Mario. “European Union and new 
regionalism. Regional actors and global governance in a post-hegemonic era.” Ashgate, 2001, p. 208. As regard to 
the lack of definition of regionalism: “A major problem, however, is to establish precisely what the term regionalism 
means. Neither a geographical nor a systemic definition alone provides a comprehensive mechanism for the 
conceptualization of the term. Geographical contiguity is clearly an essential component, but does not, of itself, 
provide any insights as to what regionalism actually is, although it does imply that a plurality of states is involved. 
Indeed, other than of the purposes of geographical or economic analysis, the term regionalism is meaningless unless 
defined in social or political terms as well. In short, the concept essentially relates to a process of political, cultural 
or social interaction between entities within its geographical bounds, and it is that process of interaction that gives it 
meaning”. See also: HUNG LING, Chun. “Regionalism or globalism? The process of telecommunication 
cooperation within the OAS and NAFTA”. In:  International Trade Law Journal, winter 2002. 
50 At least of “hybrid interregionalism”: AGGARWAL; FOGARTY. “Between regionalism and globalism: 
European Union Interregional Trade Strategies”. In: AGGARWAL, V.K; FOGARTY, E.A (Ed.) “EU Trade 
Strategies... op. cit, at p. 5. 
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European model cannot be simply transplanted into other regions of the globe51; it is not less true 
that certain basic features characterizing the European model are clearly advocated by the 
European Union when supporting other regional integration process over the world52.  
 
In this vein we can make reference to the strategy implemented by the European Union towards 
the Balkan countries as the clearest expression of this purpose so far.  Up to now the European 
Union has signed the so-called Stabilization and Association Agreements with two countries in 
that region: Croatia and FRY Macedonia, and negotiations with Albania are underway. In these 
agreements the Balkan countries commit to conclude integration agreements with their 
neighbors, being that integration in the region considered a precondition to making progress in 
the process of joining the European Union as Members. In these agreements even a deadline is 
established for the Balkan countries to conclude the required agreements. In this case the EU is 
stimulating the inception of regional integration agreements53. In other regions the EU offers 
support to existing interregional integration initiatives: we may mention the support to the 
Agadir Process in the Mediterranean54, to MERCOSUR and other integration processes in Latin 
America, to ASEAN and SAARC in Asia, to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Middle 
West55, to the various integration processes in Africa56, and so on.  
                                                 
51 On the various models of regionalism, see: HURRELL, Andrew. “The regional dimension in International 
Relations Theory”. In: FARRELL, M; HETTNE, Björn; LANGENHOVE, Luk. “Global Politics of regionalism. 
Theory and Practice”, Pluto Press: London, p. 38-53. 
52 COM (2005) 311 final, 13/07/2005 Communication from the Commission: Proposal for a joint Declaration by the 
Council, the European Parliament and The Commission on the European Union Development Policy “The European 
Consensus”: “Development policy is at the heart of EU external action”: “Regional integration and the multilateral 
trade system reinforce one another. Developing countries’ commercial policy is increasingly shaped in a regional 
context. The EU will continue to promote regional integration as a relevant strategy for harmonious and progressive 
integration of developing countries into the world economy, also in the framework of the economic partnership 
agreements”, at p. 8.  
53 And it can be said that it has been successful in the development of this strategy, for there already exists an 
Central Europe Association Agreement: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1837&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en  
54 Nevertheless Telós underlines that for the time being the promotion of regional integration in the Mediterranean 
area has been pretty unsuccessful. “The EU’s strategy to encourage partner to cooperate regionally seems to be 
particularly unsuccessful in the Mediterranean. The main question is as follows. Is the desired sub-regional 
cooperation community a matter of voluntary association or rather of a mere external coercion?; TELÓS, M. “The 
European Union and the challenges of the Near Abroad”. In: TELO, Mario. “European Union and new regionalism. 
Regional actors and global governance in a post-hegemonic era”. Ashgate, 2001, p. 183. 
55 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/gulf_cooperation/intro/index.htm  
56 As a matter of fact, the promotion of regional integration is one of the main purposes of the prospective Economic 
Partnership Agreements currently under negotiations with ACP countries. To this regard, see the explanatory 
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In addition, the European Union gets itself involved in integration processes with other States 
through different kinds of agreements.  We have already mentioned the Association and 
Stabilization agreements with the Balkan Countries where the partners are contemplated as 
potential candidates to join the European Union as members. We have also the Euro-
Mediterranean Agreements within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership57. In all 
these agreements a remarkable degree of institutionalization is achieved58. We can also mention 
the strategy implemented with regard to Russia, consisting of the establishment of four common 
spaces: common economic space, common space of freedom, security and justice, common 
space on external security and common space on research, education and culture. The road map 
that should lead to the opening of these common spaces was delivered in May last year59. This 
strategy is by far more ambitious that the strategy enshrined in the current non-preferential 
agreement (partnership and cooperation agreement) in force as from December 199760.  
 
As noted earlier some of these agreements are examples of different levels of integration 
between the European Union and non-neighboring countries. As has been said these agreements 
can be considered also as an expression of regionalism in a broad sense. Actually, the 
agreements with non-neighboring countries and those concluded with neighboring countries can 
be substantially alike. It is no longer possible to assert that the agreements with countries sharing 
borders with European Union are always more ambitious than other agreements. We can derive 
this conclusion from a comparison between Mediterranean agreements and the agreements upon 
which the relationships with Chile or with Mexico, for instance, are articulated. Nevertheless, the 
concept of preferential areas (pyramid of preferences) within the external action of the European 
Union has not been completely banished. It holds true that the amount of the financial support 
granted to the neighbors clearly exceeds the amount granted to other countries. In addition, there 
are agreements with non-neighboring countries, which do not set up an association between the 
                                                                                                                                                             
memorandum that sets out the strategy underpinning  the negotiating mandate for the European Commission: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/nepa en htm  
57 EC has entered agreements with: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordany, Morocco, Palestine Authority. The agreements 
with Lebanon, Syria and Tunes are in the process of being ratified.  
58 For example in all of them we find a binding arbitral mechanism for dispute settlement. The agreements set up a 
Council empowered to enact binding resolutions.  
59 http://europa.eu/int/comm/external relations/russia/summit 05 05/index htm  
60 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/ceeca/pca/pca russia.pdf  
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parties but only a cooperation relationship. Cooperation agreements link the European 
Community to several Asian countries.  
 
All these agreements suggest that the European Union is an expression of what Padoam defines 
as “cooperative regionalism” in contrast with other forms of regionalism that could be described 
as “conflict oriented”61. On the other hand, the fact that the European Union is pushing other 
countries to cluster themselves and consequently to operate according to a regional logic may 
lead to the surge of a sense of being part of a community in those regions62. With its regional 
approach the EU somewhat obliges these countries to agree in a common definition of needs so 
as to benefit from funds coming from Europe. The needs have to be defined on a regional basis. 
 
We cannot close this section without mentioning that the accession of new members may be seen 
as another way to spread and reinforce regionalism. The geographical extension of the European 
Union itself raises questions about the optimal size of a particular regional integration process. 
As Telós contends63, for the determination of such an optimal size questions regarding social 
cohesion within the region have to be considered. The European Union is at this moment 
negotiating with Turkey and Croatia with a view to their acceding to the European Union. And 
we know that some concerns emerge with regard to the opportunity for the European Union to 
engage in new accession negotiations without having digested completely the last one.  
 
 
V INCOHERENCIES: IMMIGRATION, ASYLUM.  
 
The difficulties within these fields arise partly from the existence of a conflict between the 
formation of identity by advocating values, which allegedly underpin the image which the 
                                                 
61 PADOAN, Pier Carlo. “Political Economy of New Regionalism.. op. cit. p 40. 
62 AGGARWAL; FOGARTY. “Between regionalism and globalism… op. cit., at p. 19: “… the EU may see 
interregionalism as a means to promote counterpart coherence and institutional mimesis among potential and actual 
regional blocs, with its own model of regional integration being the exemplar. This too could feed back into the 
European identity, promoting the view that the EU is at the vanguard of a movement toward a new form of political, 
economic, and social organization that renders old national identities obsolete (or at least less important)”. 
63 TELO: “Introduction…” In: TELO, Mario. “European Union.... op. cit., p. 21- 37 
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European Union wish to project, and the formation of identity through the exclusion of the others 
(the “exclusionary dimension of self-identity determination”64).   
 
Whereas the enlargement processes normally have been developed according with the 
proclaimed values upon which the EU´s image is built up, the incoherence pops up within the 
realm of the treatment offered to immigrants and asylum seekers. As Bretherton and Vogler 
state, the “treatment of immigration and asylum issues, involving negative stereotyping of 
migrants and increasingly restrictive eligibility criteria, appears to support the notion that a 
process of negative identification, or “active othering” is contributing to the construction of an 
EU collective identity”65. 
 
In this line we are to examine the recent Family Reunification Directive case (i). We will also 
examine in the sections below the so-called “internationalization of the asylum” (ii), as well as 
the possibility for our partners to resort to the human rights clause (enshrined in the international 
agreements celebrated by the EC with third countries) as a means to require the European Union 
to act, within the immigration and asylum field, in a manner fully consistent with the 
international obligations regarding the protection of human rights (iii).  
 
i) THE DIRECTIVE ON THE RIGHT TO FAMILY REUNIFICATION66  
 
This Directive was impugned by the European Parliament before the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ)67. The Parliament lodged an action for the partial annulment of some articles of the 
Directive on the grounds that they collided with the right for respect of family life and the right 
                                                 
64 BRETHERTON, Charlotte; VOGLER, John. “The European Union... op. cit., p. 236 
65 Ibidem, p. 238. 
66 Council Directive, 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, 2003/86/EC, OJ L 251/12 3.10.2003. 
This Directive is applicable neither to Denmark, nor to United Kingdom and Ireland. Denmark has probably the 
most restrictive family reunification system in Europe. This system is examined in: RUBIN, Lindsey. “Love’s 
refugees: the effects of stringent Danish immigration policy on Danish and their non-Danish spouse”. In: 20, 
Connecticut Journal of International law, 319. There is even a report from the former Human rights Commissioner 
within the Council of Europe denouncing that the system is not consistent with fundamental rights: Council of 
Europe, Office of the commissioner for Human Rights, Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Doc. N. Comm DH 
(2004) 12 (July 8, 2004): 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=758781&BackColorInternet=99B5AD&BackColorIntranet=FABF45&BackCol
orLogged=FFC679 (last visited on 12/July/2006) 
67 16 December 2003 
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not to be discriminated as enshrined in international treaties, such as the European Convention of 
Human Rights or the European Social Charter among others. In short, the impugned provisions 
authorize the Member States to establish some restrictions for family reunification in the case of 
children over 12 or 15 years old as well as to require specific waiting periods in order for the 
sponsor to be entitled to the right to family reunification.  
The Advocate General had issued her Opinion at the end of last year68, recommending the 
dismissal of the action on the basis that the contested articles could not be severed from the 
Directive without altering the substantial essence thereof. Nevertheless, even though she was 
advocating the dismissal of the action, the Advocate General engaged in a substantial analysis of 
the impugned provisions in order to elucidate whether they respected human rights. 
The ECJ, on its part, has just delivered its Judgment69, in which as regards to the severability 
argument, it is contended that with a view to deciding whether the contested provisions were 
severable, the need existed to previously examine the “substance of the case”, including a 
substantive analysis of the impugned provisions. This was, according to the Court, necessary in 
order to ascertain whether “the annulment would alter the Directive’s spirit and substance”. In 
view of its previous jurisprudence on the application of the inseverability argument, it could be 
said that this contention amounts to a recognition that the provisions at issue do not constitute 
either “the core” or “one of the principle axes” of the Directive70. With this reasoning, the Court 
avoids taking position on difficult questions which had been raised by the Opinion of the 
Advocate General, in which, we reiterate, she had recommended the dismissal of the action on 
the basis that the Directive was a non-severable whole, conclusion that she had reached without 
the need to previously engage in a substantial analysis of the contested provisions.  
 
                                                 
68 Opinion of the Advocate General, Juliane Kokott,  8 September 2005, C-540/03. http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-
bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs=alldocs&docj=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&n
umaff=C-540%2F03&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100.  
The Opinion is not available in English yet. We have resorted to the Spanish version.  
69 ECJ, Judgment 27 June 2006, C-540/03 
70 In two cases in which the ECJ has decided the dismissal of the action on the basis of the inseverability of the 
contested provisions, the Court has considered without going into the substance of the case, that “the contested 
provisions constitute the core of the contested regulation” (Case 36/04) or “constitute one on the principal axes of 
that Directive” (Case 244/03). 
  26 
In fact, and going into more detail on the Advocate General’s contention about the applicability 
of the inseverability argument as grounds to dismiss the action, it appears that her position was 
not sufficiently justified. There were many factors that the Advocate General had not taken into 
consideration and which would have probably driven her to a different conclusion.  
It is true that the European Court of Justice has repeatedly stated in previous judgments that a 
partial annulment is not possible if the provisions at issue cannot be severed from the remainder 
of the act (C-17/74, p. 21; C-29/99, Commission v. Council; C-378/00, Commission v. 
Parliament and Council, p. 117; C-239/01, Germany c. Commission, p. 36-37; C-68/4, p. 256; C-
244/03; C-36/04, p. 20). Being the central point of the ECJ’s reasoning in all these cases, that the 
impugned provisions must be considered non-severable if they cannot be annulled without 
altering the substance of the whole act and that this is “an objective criterion and not a subjective 
criterion linked to the political intention of the authority which adopted the measure at issue”71. 
Nonetheless, as said above, there were circumstances particularly relevant, to which the 
Advocate General failed to pay due attention in the case of the Family reunification Directive. 
Firstly, the dismissal of an action for annulment on the grounds that the contested act constituted 
an indivisible whole, has been decided in rather few cases. To our knowledge, so far only in two 
cases the ECJ has dismissed the action on that basis72: Judgment 30 March 2006, C- 36/04; and 
Judgment 24 May 2005, C-244/0373.  
As regards to the existence of particularly compelling circumstances surrounding this case, 
mention must be made to the fact that there existed a crucial difference between the Family 
Reunification Directive case and the two cases were the action had been dismissed by the Court 
on the grounds that the impugned provisions were not severable from the remainder of the act. 
This fundamental difference arose from the fact that the contested provisions of the Family 
Reunification Directive were being impugned on the grounds that they allegedly failed to protect 
human rights as was required by EU Law and International Law. Indeed, in the Family 
                                                 
71 See for example paragraph 37, C- 239/01. 
72 There have been other cases in which the European Court of Justice after recognizing that the contested articles 
were not severable from the rest of the Act and ruling out the possibility of a partial annulment has eventually 
decided to annul the whole Act. Examples: C- 68/94; C-376/98. 
73 It is worth noting that in this particular point the European Commission aligned with the European Parliament 
sustaining the divisibility of the Directive.  
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Reunification case, human rights protection was at stake, furthermore some of the human rights 
at issue were rights conferred upon a particularly vulnerable group of people: the children. To 
put it another way, if the ECJ had been particularly restrictive in its application of the non-
severable whole doctrine to dismiss actions for annulment, by the same token it could have been 
expected an equally restrictive approach in this case, considering that human rights protection 
was the fundamental issue.  
We do not find any reflection on this point in the Judgment of the Court. It is true that the Court 
deviated from the Advocate General’s Opinion but not by saying that the non-severability 
argument might not have been applied to this case for its connection to human rights protection. 
The deviation from the Advocate General’s Opinion arises out of the fact that the dismissal has 
not been founded by the ECJ on the application of the non-severable whole argument but on the 
grounds that the contested provisions were not inconsistent with fundamental rights. As already 
said, the Advocate General had firstly concluded that the Directive constituted an indivisible 
whole and then, on the basis of the substantial analysis of the contested provisions she had found 
that one of such provisions, article 8, might be deemed inconsistent with International law74. 
Thus, if the Court had followed the Advocate General’s Opinion, in its integrity, the result would 
have been that a Directive with at least one provision inconsistent with international law would 
have remained in force.  We, therefore, miss further reflection on the part of the Court, on the 
application of the non-severability doctrine to provisions related to fundamental rights. 
To our view the ECJ has lost a splendid opportunity to shed some light on the blur contours of 
the inseverability argument. It would have been sound and fully consistent with the relevance 
accorded by the European Union to the protection of human rights, to make clear that the non-
severability argument should not lead to a situation in which a provision infringing human rights 
is kept in force. Besides, in contrast with the finding of the Court our view is that there was no 
need to go into the substance of the case to decide whether the severability argument could be 
                                                 
74 In this vein, it is worth noting that the Advocate General herself contends, in her analysis of the impugned 
provisions, that Article 8 of the Directive could be deemed inconsistent with the obligations assumed by the EC in 
regard to human rights protection. As seen above, this provision allows Member States to require 2 years in 
residence before conferring on the immigrant the right to family reunification. This waiting period might even be 
extended up to three years.  
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utilized in this case. Whereas the contention of the Court is that inasmuch as the contested 
provisions fully respect human rights, there is no need to rule on the severability of such 
provisions; our point is that even though the Court had found that the contested provisions 
infringed human rights, the severability argument could not have been invoked as grounds to 
dismiss the action.  
i.1 The European Parliament’s role in this case 
In this case it is the European Parliament who took the lead, with a view to removing certain 
articles of the impugned Directive. At first sight it could be deemed as striking that the European 
Commission was supporting the Council, placing itself far from the EU’s interest to project the 
image of being an international actor primarily committed to the promotion and respect for 
human rights. From our point of view, the scope of getting more EC legislation enacted as a way 
to occupy new fields should not be pursued at any price. It seems not to suffice the justification 
that the harmonization that the Directive brings about, adds a new guarantee because by 
enshrining the international standards of protection in the Directive, these standards become a 
parameter of legality also within the European Community legal order, so that theoretically any 
national action inconsistent with these standards might be contested on the grounds that it 
infringes EC Law as well. In this sense, the basic idea underlying both the Advocate General’s 
Opinion and the subsequent ECJ´s Judgment reads as follows: the provisions at issue may be 
interpreted in accordance with the pertinent international obligations and therefore they may be 
also implemented by the States in a way fully consistent with fundamental rights. But even if this 
approach is accepted as formally correct, the problem arises out of the fact that it will be 
certainly difficult to guarantee that the right interpretation will prevail in every case, mainly 
when the validity of some of the criteria used to restrict the right to family reunification must be 
established on a case by case basis.  
Let’s engage in a more detailed analysis of the Judgment of the Court in the next sections of this 
work.  
 
i.2 The substance of the case 
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As already said, the European Parliament impugned this Directive before the Court on 16 
December 2003. The EP contested more precisely three provisions of the Directive: Article 4.1 
(last paragraph)75, article 4.676, and article 877.  
The Directive at issue was adopted by the Council on the basis of article 63, paragraph 1, point 3 
of the EC Treaty. The second paragraph of the Preamble of the Directive expresses the 
commitment to abide by international law in the following terms: “Measures concerning family 
reunification should be adopted in conformity with the obligation to protect the family and 
respect family life enshrined in many instruments of international law. This Directive respects 
the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular in Article 8 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”.   
We find particularly interesting the reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In paragraph 
38 of its Judgment, the ECJ refers to the non-binding nature of the Charter, stating that by 
mentioning this Document in the Preamble, the EC legislator intended to underline its relevance. 
We might ask whether it is possible to go beyond this reflection about the relevance of the 
Charter. It might be contended that in spite of the non-binding nature of this instrument, it would 
be possible for the legislative power to confer binding effect upon it. In this sense, if the express 
commitment to respecting and observing the rights and principles enshrined in the Charter had 
                                                 
75 “By way of derogation, where a child is aged over 12 years and arrives independently from the rest of his/her 
family, the member states may, before authorising entry and residence under this Directive, verify whether he or she 
meets a condition for integration provided for by its existing legislation on the date of implementation of this 
Directive.  
As regards to this point, paragraph 12 of the Preamble states that “the possibility of limiting the right to family 
reunification of children over the age of 12, whose primary residence is not with the sponsor, is intended to reflect 
the children's capacity for integration at early ages and shall ensure that they acquire the necessary education and 
language skills in school”. 
 
76 “6. By way of derogation, Member States may request that the applications concerning family reunification of 
minor children have to be submitted before the age of 15, as provided for by its existing legislation on the date of the 
implementation of this Directive. If the application is submitted after the age of 15, the Member States which decide 
to apply this derogation shall authorize the entry and residence of such children on grounds other than family 
reunification” 
77 Article 8: “Member States may require the sponsor to have stayed lawfully in their territory for a period not 
exceeding two years, before having his/her family members join him/her. 
By way of derogation, where the legislation of a Member State relating to family reunification in force on the date of 
adoption of this Directive takes into account its reception capacity, the Member State may provide for a waiting 
period of no more than three years between submission of the application for family reunification and the issue of a 
residence permit to the family members” 
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been included in the main body of the Directive, the Charter would have become a parameter for 
measuring the validity of the latter. In this particular case, nonetheless, the commitment to abide 
by the Charter is not as compelling for it is included in the Preamble (which as stated recently by 
the Court of First Instance “has no inherent legal significance”78).  
 
In paragraph 31 to 33 of its Judgment, the ECJ lists all the international provisions whose 
violation is denounced by the European Parliament. Basically, this institution contended that the 
impugned Directive was inconsistent with article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which regulates the right for respect of family life and which had been interpreted by the 
ECJ as including the right to family reunification (Case Carpenter79) and article 14 enshrining the 
right not to be discriminated, contending that the envisaged restrictions for minors over 12 and 
15 years of age were inconsistent therewith. 
 
Other relevant international rules, which we also find listed by the Advocate General in her 
Opinion, were, along with the already mentioned European Charter of Human Rights, the 
European Social Charter (article 19), the European Convention on the Legal Status of migrant 
workers (article 12), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (articles 17, 23 and 24), 
the UN Convention on the rights of the Child (articles 9, 10 and 3), the UN Migrant Workers´ 
Convention (article 44) and the ILO Convention n 143 (article 13).    
 
i.3 The absurdity arising from the different levels of protection accorded to the family in the 
cases of removal and reunion.  
 
On the basis of the jurisprudence of both the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR)80 it can be safely maintained that the protection afforded to the family members against 
the expulsion goes well beyond the extent to which a right to reunion is recognized to the same 
individuals.  In fact whereas the right to respect for family life, as enshrined in the European 
Convention, is interpreted as not giving the members of the family a right to enter the territory of 
                                                 
78 Court of First Instance, Judgment case T-367/03, 30 March 2006 
79ECJ, C-60/00, Carpenter. 
80 See for instance, ECHR, Judgment 11 July 2002, Amrollahi v. Denmark 
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the State where the sponsor lives, the removal of the members of the family from the country 
where they live with the sponsor may more clearly be considered an infringement of the right to 
respect for family life as established in Article 8.1 of the European Convention on Human rights 
81.   
  
For example in the above mentioned Carpenter case82, the ECJ ruled against the order to expel a 
woman from Philippines who had remained in United Kingdom after the expiration of her 
residence permission, being married with a British national in the meantime83, sustaining that her 
removal would have amounted to an infringement to the right to respect for family life. 
 
In view of these different approaches applied to the expulsion of the family members, on the one 
hand, and to the reunion, on the other, we may ask whether the immigrants are not being 
unintentionally encouraged to evade the law when bringing their family (and particularly their 
offspring) to Europe. In fact, it would be very difficult to justify a decision to expel a minor once 
it had been demonstrated that he/she had been living within the European territory, even though 
the minor had irregularly crossed the European border. In the Judgment in the Akrich case the 
ECJ ruled in the following terms:  “Where a national of a Member State married to a national of 
a non-Member State with whom she is living in another Member State returns to the Member 
State of which she is a national in order to work there as an employed person and, at the time of 
her return, her spouse does not enjoy the rights provided for in Article 10 of Regulation No 
1612/68 because he has not resided lawfully on the territory of a Member State, the competent 
authorities of the first-mentioned Member State, in assessing the application by the spouse to 
enter and remain in that Member State, must none the less have regard to the right to respect for 
family life under Article 8 of the Convention, provided that the marriage is genuine84”  
 
                                                 
81 ECJ, C-109/01, Akrich, paragraph 59 
82 Judgment C-60/00 
83 Judgment C-60/00, paragraph 13  
84 Paragraph 61 
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In the same line we could draw attention on a very recent judgment of the European Court of 
Human rights where it has ruled against the order of expulsion from Leetonia of a Russian 
national. Paragraphs 77-78 of this Judgment are particularly enlightening to this regard85.  
 
We would also like to bring the readers´ attention to paragraph 53 of the ECJ´s Judgment on the 
family reunification Directive86. In the same sense we might also mention article 10(2) of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: “where national borders separate children from their 
parents, states must allow sufficient freedom of movement to enable the families to see one 
another regularly”87. With these elements in sight, the difficulties to avoid that the minors, even 
though not entitled to family reunion, enter the European territory with the intention of 
remaining, are pretty clear88.  
 
i.4 The first provision at issue: last sub-paragraph of article 4.1 
 
                                                 
85 Judgment 15 June 2006, Affaire Sevanova c. Lettonia:  
« 77. La Cour rappelle que la plupart des requêtes similaires que la Cour a examinées jusqu’à présent sous l’angle de 
l’article 8 de la Convention, concernaient des cas où l’étranger expulsé ou en voie d’expulsion avait commis des 
crimes ou des délits graves (voir, parmi d’autres, les arrêts Moustaquim, El Boujaïdi, Dalia et Baghli, précités, ainsi 
que Beldjoudi c. France, arrêt du 26 mars 1992, série A no 234-A ; Nasri c. France, arrêt du 13 juillet 1995, série A 
no 320-B ; Boughanemi c. France, arrêt du 24 avril 1996, Recueil 1996-II ; Bouchelkia c. France, arrêt du 
29 janvier 1997, Recueil 1997-I ; Mehemi c. France, arrêt du 26 septembre 1997, Recueil 1997-VI ; Boujlifa 
c. France, arrêt du 21 octobre 1997, Recueil 1997-VI, et Ezzouhdi c. France, no 47160/99, 13 février 2001). Dans 
une partie de ces affaires, la Cour a constaté une violation de l’article 8 de la Convention nonobstant la gravité des 
condamnations pénales prononcées contre les intéressés. En revanche, dans la présente affaire, les faits incriminés à 
la requérante ne constituaient pas une infraction pénale au sens strict du terme, mais une simple contravention 
administrative passible d’une amende relativement modérée –, qui, de surcroît, ne lui a jamais été infligée. 
78. En résumé, et après avoir mis en balance, d’un côté, la gravité du comportement reproché à la requérante, et, de 
l’autre côté, celle de la mesure appliquée à son égard, la Cour conclut que les autorités lettonnes ont outrepassé la 
marge d’appréciation dont jouissent les États contractants dans le domaine en question, et qu’elles n’ont pas ménagé 
un juste équilibre entre le but légitime que constitue la défense de l’ordre et l’intérêt de la requérante à voir protéger 
son droit au respect de la vie privée. Elle ne saurait donc conclure que l’ingérence litigieuse était « nécessaire dans 
une société démocratique ». 
Partant, il y a eu violation de l’article 8 de la Convention ». 
86 Thus, the Court had held that, even though the ECHR does not guarantee as a fundamental right the right of an 
alien to enter or to reside in a particular country, the removal of a person from a country where close members of his 
family are living may amount to an infringement of the right to respect for family life as guaranteed by Article 8(1) 
of the ECHR (Carpenter, paragraph 42, and Akrich, paragraph 59). 
87 GA Res. 44/25, annex, UN GAOR, 44th Session, supp. N. 49, at 167, UN Doc. A/44/49(1989). 
88 It is of interest to mention that in European countries, such as Spain or Italy the fact that the minor is in an 
irregular situation would not constitute an impediment to get him/her registered in a public school.  
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The first provision at issue is, as already said, the last sub-paragraph of article 4.1, which applies 
to the cases in which the minor over the age of 12 arrives to Europe separately from the “rest of 
the family”89.  
 
This provision has to be associated with recital 12 in the Preamble of the Directive, which reads 
as follows: “The possibility of limiting the right to family reunification of children over the age 
of 12, whose primary residence is not with the sponsor, is intended to reflect the children's 
capacity for integration at early ages and shall ensure that they acquire the necessary education 
and language skills in school” 
 
As the European Parliament denounced, if the goal was to facilitate the integration of the minor, 
it could have been pursued through means other than just the erection of barriers to the minor 
entrance. These other means might be rather addressed to facilitate the integration of the minor 
once he/she has crossed the European borders. 
 
According to the reasoning of the ECJ (paragraph 70), the concept of integration enshrined in the 
contested provision cannot remain unspecified; on the contrary it has to be further defined by the 
implementing national legislation. Besides, the Court underlines that the conditions for 
integration can be used to evaluate the situation of a child over 12 years only when such 
conditions have been specified in the legislation existing on the date of implementation of the 
Directive. On the other hand the ECJ stresses the States´ obligation to interpret this “integration” 
notion in a manner fully consistent with the general principles of Community Law, in particular 
with fundamental rights. Indeed article 5.5 of the Directive requires the States to take into 
consideration the best interest of the minor, which can only be properly measured on a case-by-
case basis. Therefore, the idea underlying the ECJ´s reasoning is that the wording, interpretation 
and application of national laws implementing the conditions for integration must be necessarily 
consistent with fundamental rights.  
 
In accordance with the system set forth by the Directive, in order for a minor aged over 12 years 
to benefit from family reunification he/she will have to demonstrate that he/she meets the 
                                                 
89 ¨The Directive refers to minors over 12 whose "primary residence is not with the sponsor”. See Recital 12.  
  34 
condition for integration. He or she could be submitted to a test with a view to measuring to what 
extent he/she knows the language and culture of the country of destination. It is of interest to say 
that the immigrants, in general, are being submitted to this kind of “integration tests” in some 
European countries such as Germany or Holland. In view of the way in which these tests have 
been designed and are being applied, many doubts arise. Let’s think, for example, of the 
difficulty to get proper language training (particularly in the language of some European 
countries) in some countries of origin. To not mention the cost of this kind of training that may 
be simply unaffordable for people leaving in acute poverty conditions in their countries of origin. 
This kind of tests can certainly amount to indirect discrimination because the chance to meet the 
required conditions will differ depending on the country of origin of the applicant as well as on 
his/her personal economic capacity90. This kind of “integration” measures will be clearly 
detrimental for minors arriving from low-income countries. Even though it is known that the 
immigration policy is intrinsically discriminatory, it is difficult to avoid the disappointment 
arising from the contemplation of a result so harmful for minors, which will have little chance to 
meet this “condition for integration”. 
 
The ECJ also contends that the choice of 12 years as the age to establish the restriction is not 
arbitrary, and that, therefore, it cannot be considered discriminatory on grounds of age. Its 
finding in Paragraph 74 reads as follows: “the criterion corresponds to a stage in the life of a 
minor child when the latter has already lived for a relatively long period in a third country 
without the members of his or her family, so that integration in another environment is liable to 
give rise to more difficulties”. This contention contradicts recent reports that caveat on the 
detrimental consequences arising for the minor from being far from their parents. This problem 
has been particularly analysed as regards Latin-American migrants, who flee their countries 
leaving their offspring behind with the scope to support them from abroad with the remittances. 
Even though the remittances are being encouraged and facilitated for their undeniable positive 
effects for the economy of both the families and the States of origin, further analysis from the 
perspective of the psychology of migration is needed.  
 
                                                 
90 In the rules regulating this integration tests we find also direct discrimination. For example under the Dutch 
system nationals of high-income countries such as Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand or Japan are 
exempted from the tests which are applied to immigrants arriving to Holland from other countries.    
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The reasoning of the ECJ continues in paragraph 75: “the fact that a spouse and a child over 12 
years of age are not treated in the same way cannot be regarded as unjustified discrimination 
against the minor child. The very objective of marriage is long-lasting married life together, 
whereas children over 12 years of age will not necessarily remain for a long time with their 
parents. It was therefore justifiable for the Community legislature to take account of those 
different situations, and it adopted different rules concerning them without contradicting itself”.  
We cannot see as clearly as it is perceived by the ECJ that a married couple will live together 
longer than a parent with his/her offspring even though the children are over the age of 12. On 
the other hand, and in line with what has just been said, it seems to be more important for the 
minors (which are shaping their personalities) to live together with their parents than for a 
partner to live together with his/her spouse. In any case, we think that from the wording of the 
Directive, some guarantees arise. For example it seems sound to maintain that should the spouse 
be recognized the right to reunion, the children - whatever their age - could not be forced to 
remain in their country of origin. To support this contention mention has to be made to the 
wording of the provision at issue, which contemplates the cases in which the minor arrives 
“independently from the rest of his/her family”. In view of this reference it might even be 
maintained that when more than one member of the family is submitting the application for 
reunification, the applicants, even though they are minors aged over 12, should not be submitted 
to the restrictions envisaged in last paragraph of article 4.1. Nevertheless we would have to add 
that the reference in Recital 12 of the Preamble is to minors aged over 12 “whose primary 
residence is not with the sponsor”. This would be the situation of a minor over 12 even when 
he/she applies for reunification along with one of his/her parents. So, doubts arise about whether 
in these cases the derogation envisaged in the provision at issue might be applied. No direct 
guidance to this regard can be found in the ECJ´s judgment. Perhaps the continuous reference to 
the need to take due regard to the best interest of the minor (in accordance with article 5.5. of the 
Directive), might be taken as implicitly discarding the possibility of applying the “conditions for 
integration” in the case of minors over 12 who apply for reunification along with other members 
of the family to whom the right to reunion is recognized. 
  
At this point we may provide a first general impression about this Judgment. From our point of 
view, even though the ECJ´s decision may be deemed as formally correct, we would have 
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preferred to see the Court engaged in a more in-depth analysis of the system enacted by the 
Directive. The shadow of the doubt pops up when analysing some of the possible results in 
which the implementation of the Directive might end up. It is true that the Court has stressed that 
the national implementation rules have to be enacted in a manner fully consistent with 
fundamental rights, otherwise the possibility exists of contesting those rules on the grounds that 
they infringe EC Law. But we have doubts about the effectiveness of this alleged guarantee.  
 
i.5 Second contested provision: article 4.6 
 
According to the Council, the scope of this provision is to encourage the parents to bring their 
children to Europe at early ages91, when their integration is easier.  
 
The proclaimed scope seems pretty implausible considering that there exist other means to 
achieve such a goal that are also less detrimental to the children. Indeed, the parents can be 
encouraged to bring their children to Europe at early ages through positive means instead of 
choosing the restrictive way, consisting of depriving the minor over 15 years of age of the right 
to family reunification.  
 
In view of the article 4.6 of the Directive, some reflections arise about the relevance of the 
wording used to define a legal situation. Even though it is clarified in the contested provision that 
the right of a minor aged over 15 to join the sponsor might be recognized “on other grounds”, the 
exclusion of such minor from the circle of subjects benefited from the right to family 
reunification is not deprived of detrimental effects. Under this regime, the minor aged over 15 is 
not treated as a member of the family. In this line, it is of interest to draw attention to recital 10 
in the Preamble of the Directive, from which it may be inferred that the reach of the right to 
family reunification is directly associated with the definition of family. It is worth reproducing 
the wording of this recital: “It is for the Member States to decide whether they wish to authorise 
family reunification for relatives in the direct ascending line, adult unmarried children, 
unmarried or registered partners as well as, in the event of a polygamous marriage, minor 
children of a further spouse and the sponsor. Where a Member State authorises family 
                                                 
91 Judgment, paragraph 79 
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reunification of these persons, this is without prejudice of the possibility for Member States 
which do not recognise the existence of family ties in the cases covered by this provision of not 
granting to the said persons the treatment of family members with regard to the right to reside in 
another Member State, as defined by the relevant EC legislation”.  
 
Last, but not least, we would like to close this section by mentioning the report issued by the 
former Commissioner on Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Mr. Álvaro Gil Robles, about 
the regulation of immigration in Denmark. In this Report, the Commissioner declared the 
following with regard to a Danish provision akin to Article 4.6 of the EC Directive:  
 
“16. The Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as any human being 
below the age of eighteen years and states that the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration in all matters affecting the child.15 The Convention further 
recognises that the child should grow up in a family environment, and requires that State 
Parties deal with applications by a child for family reunification in a positive, humane 
and expeditious manner (Article 10). Whilst this Article does not explicitly spell out an 
automatic right of a child to be reunited in the parent’s country of residence, it clearly 
assumes that a possibility to apply for family reunification be given to a child.  
17. The Minister for Integration insisted that such a possibility did exist for children over 
14 in virtue of the general exception provided in article 9(c) of the Aliens Act. This 
provision may well formally permit the granting of a residence permit for the purposes of 
family reunion to minors over 14 years old on the basis of the best interest of the child, as 
is required under the Convention on the Rights of the Child; indeed, the Government bill 
stresses that their best interest is to be respected in all decision involving them. It might 
reasonably be assumed, however, that family reunion will in fact be in the best interest of 
the child in the great majority of cases. It is rather incongruous therefore, and certainly 
dissuasive, to establish a general rule presuming the contrary and to leave the expression 
of the exceptional grounds for awarding family reunification to minors over 14 (under a 
catch-all clause) to the explanatory notes of a Government bill. Such a situation fails to 
secure the legal certainty that ought to surround the determination of fundamental rights”  
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Mr Álvaro Gil Robles´ contentions are particularly enlightening. He finished his report by 
encouraging both the Danish Government and Parliament “to reconsider the provisions relating 
to family reunification”92. In view of this Report we might ask whether the contested provision 
of the Directive would resist the scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
 
i.6 Third Provision at issue: article 8  
 
The contested provision authorizes the Member States “to require a maximum of two years’ 
lawful residence before the sponsor may be joined by his/her family members. The second 
paragraph of Article 8 authorises Member States whose legislation takes their reception capacity 
into account to provide for a waiting period of no more than three years between the application 
for reunification and the issue of a residence permit to the family members”93   
 
According to the reasoning of the Court, the scope of this restriction is to permit the Member 
States “to make sure that family reunification will take place in favourable conditions, after the 
sponsor has been residing in the host State for a period sufficiently long for it to be assumed that 
the family members will settle down well and display a certain level of integration. Accordingly, 
the fact that a Member State takes those factors into account and the power to defer family 
reunification for two or, as the case may be, three years do not run counter to the right to respect 
for family rights set out in particular in Article 8 of the ECHR as interpreted by the European 
Court of Human Rights”.  
 
It is worth underlining that here the Court is more complacent with the Council’s position than 
the Advocate General, who had considered in her Opinion that Article 8 might be deemed 
inconsistent with the human rights standards derived from international aw.  
 
                                                 
92The Report in its integrity can be found in: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=758781&BackColorInternet=99B5AD&BackColorIntranet=FABF45&BackCol
orLogged=FFC679  
93 Judgment, Paragraph 98 
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Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice introduces some nuances shaped as caveats 
addressed to the Member States. In paragraph 99, and taking article 17 of the Directive as a 
basis, the Court maintains that the duration of the residence can be only one of the circumstances 
that have to be taken into consideration by the national authorities with a view to deciding about 
reunification. The consequence is that a decision to dismiss the application for reunification must 
be taken, on a case-by-case basis, paying due regard to other relevant circumstances as well. To 
put another way, a national law conditioning the right to family reunification to a waiting period 
of 2 years on a general basis would be inconsistent with fundamental rights: (“a waiting period 
cannot be imposed without taking into account, in specific cases, all the relevant factors”: 
paragraph 99).  
 
The ECJ reaches this conclusion even though the wording of the contested provision is not clear 
to this regard. The ECJ requires that the provision be interpreted in the context, paying attention 
especially to article 17.  
 
The ECJ, in paragraph 100, goes further in nuancing its first finding about the consistency of 
the waiting periods with human rights, by maintaining that the reception capacity cannot be 
used as a criterion to deprive an immigrant of the right to reunification on a general basis when 
the condition of three years of residence is not met. On the contrary, the European Court 
maintains that this criterion can only be used in particular cases and that the absorption 
capacity will have to be genuinely established at the time of the application. We face again the 
same problem; it is difficult to cope with the legal uncertainty resulting from these provisions.  
 
The European Court of Justice ends with a call on the States to abide by international rules 
when implementing the Directive. And recalls (in what seems not to be a very good omen) that 
the national implementing rules might be contested before the national courts, which on their 
turn might resort to the ECJ itself.  
 
Finally it is of interest to mention that there exist other provisions in this Directive, which even if 
not impugned by the European Parliament raise some doubts about their consistency with 
fundamental rights. As an example, we might mention article 4.5 fixing in 21 years the minimum 
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age for a partner to be entitled to the right to reunion with the sponsor. Taking into consideration 
that in none of the Member States there exists a provision fixing the minimum age to get married 
in 21 years, we can legitimately ask whether this restriction in the case of family reunification is 
justified. The reason given with a view to explaining or justifying this restriction is the need to 
both ensure better integration and prevent forced marriages. It is clear that this scope could have 
been pursued through less restrictive measures, which would have been also more coherent.  
 
i.7 The final reference to the primacy of the European Social Charter and the European 
Convention on the legal status of the migrant workers.  
 
We have to mention that the ECJ refers to article 3.4 of the Directive, in which precedence over 
the provisions of the Directive is accorded to these international instruments: European Social 
Charter and the European Convention on the legal status of the migrant workers94. Article 19.6 
of the European Social Charter sets forth the obligation for the States parties to: “facilitate as far 
as possible the reunion of the family of a foreign worker permitted to establish himself in the 
territory”.  The interpretation of this article as provided in the Appendix to the European Social 
charter revised, reads as follows: “family of a foreign worker is understood to mean at least the 
worker’s spouse and unmarried children as long as the latter are considered to be minors by the 
receiving state and are dependent on the migrant worker”. In sight of these provisions it should 
be maintained firstly, that the minimum age required in order for the spouse to be recognized the 
right to join the sponsor and which, as seen above, is fixed in the age of 21 years by the 
Directive, would not be applicable to the nationals from the State parties to the European Social 
Charter. Secondly we could also contend, on the basis of the same provisions, that the exceptions 
envisaged in the Directive for minors aged over 12 and 15 years would not be applicable to 
minors coming from States parties to the Convention95 as long as they meet the less stringent 
conditions established within the European Social Charter framework: that they are considered to 
be minors by the State of destination and that they are dependent on the migrant worker (this 
would be the case of the minor sustained by the sponsor’s remittances).  
 
                                                 
94 The formula used is: “this Directive is without prejudice to more favourable provisions of” 
95 There are some non European Union member States, which are parties to the European Social Charter: Albania, 
Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Norway and Romania.  
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Within the European Convention on the legal status of migrant workers, the relevant provision is 
article 12, whose first paragraph refers to a “waiting period” which “shall not exceed of 12 
months”. Within the field of “family reunification” and by the reference made in the main body 
of the Directive, this European Convention becomes binding even upon those Member States 
that have not ratified it yet. There are non member States of the EU (Moldova, Ukraine and 
Turkey), which have ratified this Convention. Therefore the nationals from these States will 
benefit from the more favourable regime envisaged in the European Convention. As a 
consequence, no more stringent waiting periods might be established, on the basis of the 
Directive on family reunification, with regard to the nationals of these countries. 
 
Finally, there is also another possibility which has not been expressly contemplated by the ECJ. 
Indeed, the Directive gives also precedence to more favourable provisions included in bilateral or 
multilateral treaties between the Community and third countries, including of course mixed 
agreements. This could be the case with the Association and Stabilization Agreements, within 
which the regulation of the access of the spouse and children to the labour market is less 
stringent than in the Directive.  
 
i.8 Global Conclusion 
 
The overall impression after having examined the Judgment might be that the ECJ has left 
behind the opportunity to force the European institutions to be more coherent in their approach to 
the immigration issue. Nonetheless, maybe it should be recognized as well that it is not in the 
Court’s hands to change the mentalities of some recalcitrant States, which eventually impose 
their points of view within the European institutions. We find here another illustration of the 
relevance of the consensus among the Member States and at the same time an evidence of how 
costly can be to achieve such a consensus96. It is demonstrated on the other hand that the 
coherence is not always guaranteed when the consensus is reached.   
 
                                                 
96 The contested restrictions regarding to minors were included in the Directive to satisfy the aspirations of Germany 
(which had in force restrictions in the case of minors over 12 year) and Austria (which does not contemplate the 
minor aged over 15 years as entitled to family reunification).  
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Even though the European Parliament’s arguments have not been backed up by the ECJ and the 
result may be judged as daunting at first sight; we preserve some doses of moderate optimism. 
This optimism is grounded on our conviction that this Judgment opens the door to further 
scrutiny of the implementing national measures and that, at that stage, we will probably witness a 
more passionate defence of fundamental rights. In this line, it might be said that the ECJ has 
merely deferred the moment in which it will have to establish more clear limitations arising from 
the need to respect fundamental rights within this field. 
ii) THE READMISSION AGREEMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
ASYLUM 
The resort to readmission agreements97 in the case of refugees on the basis of the principle that 
the asylum seeker has to lodge its application on the first safe country he reaches raises some 
doubts about its consistency with international obligations98. Even though this so-called 
“internationalisation” of the asylum might contribute to the creation of a dynamic of cooperation 
within the region of origin of refugees, it is undeniable that in order to get this result, it has to be 
accompanied by the sufficient support from the EU to the so-called “safe countries” in order to 
alleviate them from the burden arising from the need to provide adequate protection to asylum 
seekers.  
At first sight many questions arise from the contemplation of this European strategy with regard 
to asylum. Might Internationalization of protection be conceived of as an additional illustration 
of the European commitment to promoting “regional solidarity”? What about interregional 
solidarity? It seems sound to contend that in the name of this interregional solidarity, sufficient 
support (financial, technical and so on) should be provided to the countries overburdened by the 
need to offer due protection to refugees.  As already said, the idea that the persons should be 
                                                 
97 So far, there exist readmission agreements with Albania, Hong Kong, Macao, Sri Lanka and Russia. There are 
negotiations underway with Morocco, Ukraine, Turkey, China, Pakistan and Algeria.  
98 The first safe country rule is based upon a broad interpretation of Conclusion 58 (XL) of the Executive Committee 
of UNHCR’s Programme: “The phenomenon of refugees, whether they have formally been identified as such or not 
(asylum-seekers), who move in an irregular manner from countries in which they have already found protection, in 
order to seek asylum or permanent resettlement elsewhere, is a matter of growing concern. This concern results from 
the destabilizing effect which irregular movements of this kind have on a structured international effort to provide 
appropriate solutions for refugees. Such irregular movements involve entry into the territory of another country, 
without the prior consent of the national authorities or without an entry visa, or with no or insufficient 
documentation normally required for travel purposes, or with false or fraudulent documentation.” 
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attended as closer to their country of origin as possible may be deemed as positive only insofar 
as it encompasses a serious commitment to offering the necessary support for these regional 
safety networks become an effective reality99. Otherwise, the impression is that the EU is only 
trying to deflect the burden on others100. Should these “others” not be in conditions to abide by 
the international obligations concerning refugees, the European Union might certainly be held 
responsible for the resulting breach of international law. So far, specific regional protection 
programs have been created for Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Tanzania, and it has already 
been criticized that the funds envisaged in these Programs are insufficient to offer a proper 
support for these countries101. 
 
According to the Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status102, there are four criteria used to decide if a country 
might be considered safe. These criteria, according to article 27.1 of the Procedure Directive are 
the following: “i) Asylum seekers’ lives or freedom must not be threatened on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social or political opinion; ii) countries must 
respect the principle of non-refoulement; iii) there can be no risk of the person being removed to 
another country where they may face torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; and 
they must be able to request and to be granted refugee protection in that third country in 
accordance with the Geneva Convention. This so-called “Procedure Directive” raises some 
doubts about its consistency with international obligations and has been brought by the European 
Parliament before the ECJ within the framework of the action for annulment103.  
 
                                                 
99 PERAL, Luis. “Límites jurídicos al discurso político sobre el control de los flujos migratorios: non refoulement, 
protección en la región de origen  y cierre de las fronteras europeas”. In: Revista Electrónica de Estudios 
Internacionales, n. 11, 2006. http://www reei.org/reei%2011/L.Peral(reei11).pdf  
On the readmission policy see: BOUTEILLET-PAQUET, Daphné. “Passing the buck: a critical analysis of the 
readmission policy implemented by the EU and its Member States”. In: European Journal of Migration and Law 5, 
2003, p. 359-377. 
100See: “An ECRE evaluation of the development of EU minimum standards for refugee protection. Tampere 1999 – 
Brussels 2004”, June 2004: (www.ecre.org):: “What we went on to witness was five years of difficult negotiations 
not driven by the spirit of Tampere, but driven by most European governments’ aim to keep the number of asylum 
seekers arriving as low as possible and by their concerns to tackle perceived abuses of their asylum systems. 
Countries showed little sense of solidarity and pursued their narrow national agendas at great cost to refugees and to 
the building of a fair and efficient European protection system.” 
101 PERAL, Luis. “Límites jurídicos… op. cit.  
102 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on proceedings in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status.  
103 Action brought on 8 March 2006 - European Parliament v Council of the European Union (Case C-133/06) 
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It seems clear that, as contended by Cathryn Costello further guarantees should be provided for 
by the European Community as regards the monitoring of the situation of the asylum seeker once 
she is expelled to a so-considered “safe country”104. What happens if the country, labelled as a 
“safe country” by the EC, defines its own list of safe countries? Is there any possibility for the 
EC to control this list? May this chain lead to a refugee-in-orbit situation or what is worse to 
refoulement?  Furthermore, we have to keep in sight that considering the living conditions in 
many of the countries qualifying as “safe”, it should come as no surprise if the asylum seeker 
prefers to be an irregular in Europe than a refugee in one of those countries105.  
 
We are not going to go into more detail on the analysis of this Directive, the point we want to 
make at this moment is merely that it seems utterly logical to be suspicious about how easy is for 
the European Union to trust other countries as regards their ability to provide asylum seekers 
with proper protection according to international standards, whereas the same European Union is 
to a great deal reluctant to trust maybe the same countries as regards their ability to assess the 
safety of certain food products106. This landscape is deeply disappointing if seen from the point 
of view of the expectations yielded by the own European Union’s discourse. 
                                                 
104 COSTELLO, CATHRYN. “Procedures directive and the proliferation of State Country Practices: deterrence, 
deflection and the dismantling of International Protection? In: European Journal of Migration and Law 7: 35-69, 
2005. 
105 UNHCR Global Consultations, Background Paper No 2 The Application of the ‘Safe Third Country’ Notion and 
its impact on the management of flows and on the protection of refugees (Geneva: UNHCR, May 2001). Even in 
Europe, the preferences of the asylum seekers can be frustrated by the application of the first asylum country rule. 
See to this regard, the information provided by Barry Junker about the situation of refugees in Poland: “Burden 
sharing or border shifting? Asylum and expansion in the European Union” 20 Geo. Immigra. L.J. 293.  
106 See the current debate on the amendment of the 97 Council Regulation on Novel Food (EC Regulation 258/97). 
This Regulation has two main scopes: to protect the functioning of the internal market and to protect public health. It 
sets up a system for granting a pre-marketing approval of novel foods, providing for a single safety assessment 
regarding the placing on the market of the novel foods. Novel food is defined as a food that has not been used 
significantly within the EC before 15 May 1997.  
According to the EU proposal the exotic traditional food would be considered novel food and consequently 
subjected to the safety assessment by the European authorities. Many countries in Latin America, particularly the 
Andean countries, have expressed their concerns. They consider that in assessing the safety of traditional products 
largely used in third countries, due attention should be paid to the safety statements issued by the authorities in these 
countries. Similarly, the existence of a long history of safe use should be taken into account.   
The Andean Community´s contention is their traditional products, resulting from the bewildering biodiversity 
existing in their territories, should be clearly differentiated from the so-called novel products. The procedure to get 
the authorization for marketing should be simplified, the permission should be general (through Regulation instead 
of Decision) and the spectrum of subjects authorized to apply for authorization should be broadened. It is worth 
noting that nowadays the proceedings to get an authorization for placing novel foods on the European market can 
take longer than two years on average. The procedure comprises an initial assessment by the national authorities, an 
initial assessment report, comments or reasoned objections from all Member States and the Commission, and 
possible referral to the Standing Committee for Foodstuffs. 
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iii) THE POSSIBILITY FOR OUR PARTNERS TO USE THE HUMAN RIGHTS CLAUSES 
ENSHRINED IN THE EC AGREEMENTS  
We want also very briefly to point to the possibility, at least theoretical, for our partners to make 
use of the human rights clauses included in the agreements signed with the EC. We are thinking 
of a situation in which a partner denounces either the European Community or the Member 
States (in the case of mixed agreements) for a violation of human rights of its nationals as 
immigrants in Europe. It was reported very recently in Spain107 that ten NGOs had publicly 
complained for the violation of the rights of the minor immigrants. The alleged violations were 
basically two: firstly, the systematic violation of the right of the minors to be heard during the 
procedures leading to the issuance of the expulsion resolution, with the minor receiving first 
notice of the proceedings when the resolution was handed to him by the Spanish authorities. 
Secondly, the NGOs claimed that in many cases the minors were not being brought back to the 
places where their families lived.108 The situation in Spain is particularly serious as regards 
minors arriving from Morocco and Rumania. In the latter case, there is also an ethnical 
component, for the minors who arrive to Spain are mostly from the Roma community109. 
The potential resort to the human rights clauses by our partners in these cases might be 
considered as a mere theoretical hypothesis. As a matter of fact many of the partners who are 
sources of immigration, have their own problem to demonstrate that they properly respect the 
international standards as regards human rights protection. In a way it could be said that it would 
be too cynical for most of them to use the democratic clause as a means to protest against the 
                                                                                                                                                             
In this case, and now that the project is under discussion and therefore the possibility to get it modified still exists, 
the European Union has a great opportunity to be more responsive to the needs of the developing countries while 
ensuring a proper level of public health protection. In our opinion when there is a significant history of safe use in 
other countries, the assessment of risk should be simplified.  
See on this issue:  http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/novelfood/initiatives en htm  
107 EL Pais, 14 April 2006.  
108 Femando Mariño, member of the United Nations Committee Against Torture, expresses the problem in the 
following terms: “la señalada preocupación sobre presuntos fenómenos discriminatorios (incluidos malos tratos) a 
inmigrantes, incluso en los trámites de acogida, admisión o rechazo de extranjeros en situación irregular; en 
particular, el trato y la acogida protectora a menores extranjeros (sobre todo, los no acompañados), objeto de 
recomendación reiterada en el sentido de la necesidad de mejora de los estándares y prácticas aplicados en tales 
supuestos”. Mariño Menéndez, F. “La participación del Estado español ante el comité contra la tortura de las 
Naciones Unidas”. In: “España y la ONU 50 aniversario. Asociación para las Naciones Unidas en España, Icaria 
Editorial, 2005, p. 116  
109 Another case: suspension by Senegal of the informal agreement on readmission with Spain due to the alleged 
mistreatment given to her nationals by the Spanish police.  http://www.afrol.com/es/articulos/19562  
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2006/06/01/espana/1149182190 html  
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European Community (sort of clean hands argument). Nevertheless, precisely the fact that these 
countries might have a not very clean history as regards human rights protection makes these 
European actions about which complaints might be lodged, particularly harmful because these 
actions undermine Europe’s legitimacy to lodge its own complaints against these countries. It is 
not so theoretical the possibility that these countries could resort to the clause as response to the 
use thereof by the EC against them (in a way, Europe’s hands get dirty too110). 
 
VI  FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
It is not easy to be what the European Union says that it wants to be. But it is clear that within 
the world scene the need exists of an actor playing the role that the EU seems to be keeping for 
itself.  
 
The European discourse is not only important as a means to shape the identity of the European 
Union, but also as a point of reference against which measuring the extent to which the European 
project is plausible. On the other hand, this discourse is contributing to the internalization of the 
values upon which it is built. The extent to which these basic values are internalized by the 
European society is probably greater than the extent to which they are internalized by any other 
society in the world. 
 
It has been demonstrated that there exist many European actions illustrating that the European 
discourse goes beyond the mere rhetoric. Nonetheless, it has also been demonstrated that within 
fields of a high relevance, the European actions do not always fit the discourse. In all these cases 
the underlying logic falls closer to the traditional logic applied by the superpowers, one that is 
based on imposition/power instead of recognition/reputation. The result is largely detrimental for 
the European Union itself, undermining its image as a civilian power.  
 
In the search for legitimacy it is essential for the European Union to honour its constitutive 
commitment to multilateralism. But real life is complicated, also within the realm of an 
                                                 
110 The “guiding by example” model, advocated by Weiler and Alston, results clearly undermined. A 
ALSTON; WEILER. “The European Union and Human Rights” (Florence: European University Institute) 
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international organization. We have contended that, within certain fields, the European 
incoherence seems to have a low cost in terms of internal legitimacy. Nevertheless, it is worth 
stressing also that it might have a high cost if we think of how these incoherencies undermine the 
reputation of the EU on the world scene. At the same time, from an internal point of view, the 
position of the EU vis-à-vis their member States results weakened. The EU should always be 
able to identify a supranational interest, even within these problematic fields, differentiated from 
the interest of individual States, and subsequently should be able to persuade the European 
citizens that their personal interest is closer to the supranational than to the national interest. It is 
not easy to accomplish this goal, because in order to do so the need arises for the EU to 
circumvent the Member States in its communication with the Europeans. But we also think that 
if there is a framework nowadays where this result can be achieved, this is no doubt the 
European Union.  
